Spencer S. Hsu writes in the WaPo that

[a] bipartisan task force recommended Tuesday that the Obama administration simplify and reset the U.S. government’s iconic color-coded terrorism warning system to the lowest of three new levels, if it keeps using levels at all.

U.S. Should Simplify Terror Warning System, Panel Says. (Washington Post, September 16th, 2009).

This should make deciding which tie to wear a lot easier; however, it’s not a substitute for a communications system which was silly with six vague messages – and a risk assessment/risk mitigation system which provides much more “security theater” than reasonable preparation for threats.

Homeland Security Advisory System (link to Wikipedia entry)

Bruce Schneier, who coined the term “security theater,” combines earlier comments in this post, Modifying the Color-Coded Threat Alert System, in which he points out that it could have been useful in the context of an otherwise useful system.

We suggest you read Schneier’s entire post, but certainly this passage, which gets to the heart of the matter:

The color-coded threat alerts issued by the Department of Homeland Security are useless today, but may become useful in the future. The U.S. military has a similar system; DEFCON 1-5 corresponds to the five threat alerts levels: Green, Blue, Yellow, Orange, and Red. The difference is that the DEFCON system is tied to particular procedures; military units have specific actions they need to perform every time the DEFCON level goes up or down. The color-alert system, on the other hand, is not tied to any specific actions. People are left to worry, or are given nonsensical instructions to buy plastic sheeting and duct tape. Even local police departments and government organizations largely have no idea what to do when the threat level changes. The threat levels actually do more harm than good, by needlessly creating fear and confusion (which is an objective of terrorists) and anesthetizing people to future alerts and warnings. If the color-alert system became something better defined, so that people know exactly what caused the levels to change, what the change means, and what actions they need to take in the event of a change, then it could be useful. But even then, the real measure of effectiveness is in the implementation. Terrorist attacks are rare, and if the color-threat level changes willy-nilly with no obvious cause or effect, then people will simply stop paying attention. And the threat levels are publicly known, so any terrorist with a lick of sense will simply wait until the threat level goes down.

Modifying the Color-Coded Threat Alert System on Schneier.com

; if you’re looking for calm, thoughtful analysis, Schneier’s the go-to guy.