Tag Archives: disaster preparedness

The Celestial Shooting Gallery, Part Four: “You Have Nothing to Worry About (click) Worry About (click) Worry About (click)…”

Stability Model of an experimental distribution grid

A stability map of a simple power grid. Each point on this image represents an operating state of a simple power grid consisting of a few generators. Bluish regions constitute stable working states, red unstable and ‘salt-and-pepper’ represent chaotic behavior. One can tune a grid for stability by controlling the phasing of generators and transformers on the grid and such settings suffice for day-to-day operations. It is difficult to decide where, or by how much, abnormalities such as geomagnetic storms might push a system into red, unstable regions, or, worse, salt-and-pepper regions where the system oscillates between states. It is easy to find cases on the map where chaotic regions lie very close to stable regions, indicating that the destabilizing push need not be large at all. James Thorp, Cornell University, published in IEEE Spectrum

People paid to worry about the North American power grid regard geomagnetic storms as “high impact, low-frequency” events, spawning the inevitable acronym: HILF. Low frequency, in that a geomagnetic storm as intense as May 1921, at 5,000 nano-Teslas/minute, or the 1859 Carrington Event, best guess: 7,500 nano-Teslas/minute, might not happen in our lifetimes, the lifetimes of our children, or even our grand children. If signature traces in Arctic ice core samples are correct, these are ‘500 year events.’ When it comes to deciding where to put that preventative maintenance dollar, storm-proofing Oklahoma elementary schools against EF 5 tornadoes seems a far more practical spend than the hardening of electrical grids against a half-theoretical event that might not even happen in 500 years.

What pulls planners up short is the high impact part: the utter god-awfulness of a power grid that crashes and which then can’t boot itself up. There is a self-referential dependency: fixing a dysfunctional power grid requires it to be functional, as key aspects of the manufacturing of transformers need electricity.

Nor can one expect the cavalry to ride in anytime soon, as the vast geographic reach of geomagnetic storms means that one strong enough to take down the North American grid may very likely take down Eurasian grids as well – entire hemispheres could wind up in the toilet, and we only have two hemispheres. That and the statistical variableness to it all: the Carrington 1859 and May 1921 storms, nominally two ‘500 year events’ were, in fact, separated by only sixty-two years.

Where does the buck stop? Continue reading →

Celestial Shooting Gallery, Part Three: When a CME Hits the Atmosphere

Failed GSU transformer at Salem River, NJ

A Generator Step Up (GSU) transformer failed at the Salem River Nuclear Plant during the March 1989 geomagnetic storm. The unit is depicted on the left; some of the burned 22kV primary windings are shown on the right. Though immersed in cooling oil, the windings became hot enough to melt copper, at about 2000 degrees F. John Kappenman, Metatech

Coronal Mass Ejections are mainly charged particles, protons and electrons. When a CME arrives at Earth, the charged protons and electrons come under the influence of the Earth’s own magnetic field, the magnetosphere. Charged particles spin around the lines of magnetic force that comprise the magnetosphere, which diverts most of CME harmlessly around the planet, keeping Earth’s surface tranquil.

If the ejection is large enough, however, it can distort the shape of the magnetosphere, occasionally causing magnetic flux lines to snap and reconnect. When this happens, charged particles leak in and follow the magnetosphere’s flux lines down to the Earth’s ionosphere. There, they strike oxygen and nitrogen molecules and strip them of electrons. These ionized gases glow, giving rise to the ethereal beauty of the auroras around the north and south poles. Unfortunately, these excess charged particles also produce immense electrojets.

Continue reading →

Celestial Shooting Gallery, Part Two: The Physics of Geomagnetic Storms

On August 31, 2012 a long filament of solar material that had been hovering in the sun’s atmosphere, the corona, erupted out into space at 4:36 p.m. EDT. The coronal mass ejection, or CME, traveled at over 900 miles per second. The CME did not travel directly toward Earth, but did connect with Earth’s magnetic environment, or magnetosphere, causing aurora to appear on the night of Monday, September 3. The image above includes an image of Earth to show the size of the CME compared to the size of Earth. NASA Goddard Spaceflight Center

Thursday, May 2nd, 2013, a coronal mass ejection (CME) hurled nearly one billion tons of charged particles from the sun’s corona at an outward velocity of one million miles per hour – 270 miles per second.

In less than a half hour, 2,700 virtual Empire State Buildings, 340,000 tons apiece – give or take a few gorillas – erupted from an active region of the Sun’s surface called AR1748, a northern latitude sunspot. AR1748 had just become visible on the western limb of the Sun’s surface when it ejected this mass, so the vast bulk of it hurled outward, not toward us in Libra, but more or less toward Cancer, at right-angles to us. In practical terms, it shot wide of its mark. Still an impressive shot. The CME had been triggered by an M class solar flare, the second largest in a five step scheme (An, Bn, Cn, Mn, Xn; for n a relative magnitude). It had been the largest coronal mass ejection observed thus far in 2013.

And it was still early in the day for AR1748.

Continue reading →

Celestial Shooting Gallery, Part One: The Day We Lost Quebec

John Kappenman reconstructed the electrojets which formed in the ionosphere late in the March 13, 1989 geomagnetic storm which compromised the Hydro-Quebec power grid in Canada. Concurrently, the eastward jet induced ground currents that severely strained the electrical distribution grid of northern continental United States, resulting in a transformer failure at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant, in New Jersey. Courtesy of Metatech

Nearly a quarter century ago, on March 13, 1989, a geomagnetic storm led to the collapse of the Hydro-Quebec electrical grid system, which furnishes power to much of the province of Quebec, Canada. So pervasive were abnormal currents, that protective circuit breakers tripped throughout the system, bringing the entire grid to a halt in about one and a half minutes. The grid’s self-protective systems were geared toward local abnormalities happening in particular places. In contrast, ground induced currents created abnormalities everywhere. The good news was that most of the hardware protected itself. The bad news was that six million customers were without power for as long as nine hours, and where transformer damage did occur, outages continued for another week.

Further south, the United States experienced a close shave. A second surge in the March 13 storm generated similar ground induced currents in the northern United States, with large current spikes observed from the Pacific Northwest to the mid-Atlantic states, one spike destroying a large GSU transformer at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant in New Jersey. According to John Kappenman, of the Metatech Corporation “It was probably at this time that we came uncomfortably close to triggering a blackout that could have literally extended clear across the country.”

Continue reading →

Hurricane Sandy, the Frankenstorm

Hurricane Sandy, NOAA handout satellite image taken on October 27, 2012. Note the size and position of the storm.

Hurricane Sandy, aka “The Frankenstorm,” a Hurricane with Snow, the 19th named storm of the 2012 season, is projected to hit Delaware, then New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, and Massachusetts, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine. Snow is expected in West Virginia. Winds and rain are expected as far west as Ohio. Additional satellite images are available at NOAA. Note that the Frankenstein monster was created by man.

While some are calling this the storm of the century, I see it, like Hurricane Irene of 2011, discussed here, and Katrina and Rita a few years ago, as a harbinger of things to come.

Several natural phenomena are combining with several man-made factors to interact in ways that will make this a very significant storm, and one that we expect to see repeated every few years. ABC News, National Hurricane Center, NOAA, other news and information media are providing up-to-date coverage. Popular Logistics provides analysis.

Natural Phenomena:

Hurricane Sandy is 900 miles wide – bigger than Irene.
It will interact with a cold front coming from Canada that will form a Nor’ Easter.
It will also interact with the Jet Stream, that will pull it northward, then refocus it back south-westerly arc toward New York City, Long Island, and New Jersey.
The full moon – which triggers higher tides – will trigger a storm surge.

Man made factors that will exacerbate the storm’s damage:

Atmospheric CO2 and water vapor – the concentration of carbon dioxide and water vapor is higher today due to burning fossil fuels. This means the atmosphere can hold more heat, and is holding more water, the oceans are warmer; thus storms will be bigger and more severe.
Coastal development – sand dunes gone from Long Island make us more vulnerable to storm surges and flooding
Crumbling infrastructure gives us a diminished ability to weather the storm.
Lack of emergency preparedness gives us a diminished ability to weather the storm.
Satellites, in need of repair, give us a diminished ability to monitor the storm.
Nuclear Power plants in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut will need to be monitored. Some will be shut down, as they were last year during Hurricane Irene, leading to power outages. See “Nuclear Power, Natural Disasters, and Security.”This gives us diminished ability to weather the storm, and forces us to deploy resources to safeguard infrastructure.

In August of 2011 the Millstone 2 & 3 plants in Connecticut and the Brunswick 1 & 2 plants in North Carolina were operated at reduced capacity during and after Hurricane Irene, while the Oyster Creek plant in New Jersey, and the North Anna 1 & 2 plants in Virginia, were offline. The North Anna plants were shut down before the hurricane due to the earthquake. I expect Hurricane Sandy will effect most of those plants, and also the Calvert Creek plant in Maryland, Hope Creek, and Salem in Jersey, Indian Point in New York, and Vermont Yankee, in Vermont.

Solar power, wind, and wave power won’t work during a hurricane, but don’t need emergency crew on hand to make sure cooling systems are operational. And geothermal will function.

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As an analyst with Popular Logistics, I am available for research and analysis on a per project or a per diem basis. I can be reached at ‘L Furman 97” @ G Mail . com and US 732 . 580 . 0024.

Pratik Mhatres Urban Planning Blog

Pratik Mhatre’s Urban Planning Blog

Mega Shark vs. Giant Octopus ipod is an outstanding blog, on the order of Inhabitat or The Pump Handle. Excellent recent articles include:

Time Spent Sitting In Traffic, including this infographic:

Disaster Preparedness and Voter Response [PDF link], an economist at Loyola Marymount University concludes that “on average, every $1 spent on disaster mitigation prevents roughly $8 of disaster damage over the following five years” but voters tend to reward disaster response and recovery efforts more as compared to disaster preparedness leading to governments underpreparing for disasters.

Disaster Accountability Project on the National Response Framework

Excerpts from The Disaster Accountability Project’s comments on the National Response Framework:

• “The NRF inadequately considers the needs of non-English speakers who may be foreign visitors or immigrants… Make the draft NRF readily available in Spanish and other languages spoken by a substantial portion of the population”

• “Make civil service positions less vulnerable to political pressures from above by embracing meaningful whistle-blower protections for all emergency managers, including those with security clearances; and provide an effective and supportive mechanism for receiving disclosures of inadequacies in emergency planning, exercising and response.”

• ” ‘Framework’ is indeed a more accurate name for this product ; but it is not entirely accurate. What is needed is a different product – a plan, not a name change.”

• “The description of the FEMA Director and DHS Secretary’s responsibilities conflicts with requirements of the Post Katrina Reform Act.”

• “Shifting NRF implementation to the DHS Secretary is not consistent with the intent of Congress as described in the Post Katrina Reform Act…The head of FEMA and not the DHS Secretary should be in charge of coordinating federal emergency response.”

• “Some ESF functions may be inappropriately combined, partitioned or privatized.”

• “Not all ‘lessons learned’ are publicly reported or followed up with changes to plans. For example, as TOPOFF 4 prepares to being, the TOPOFF III after-action report still has not been issued.”

• “Federal exercises frequently ignore recovery or give it lip service if addressed at all… Ensure that adequate exercise time is allowed to cover long-term recovery issues in reasonable detail.”

• “Logic suggests that the FEMA Administrator would be the coordinator of the federal response, not the DHS Secretary’s advisor… The roles of the FEMA Director and Director of Operations Coordination appear to conflict, calling to mind post-Katrina confusion.”

DAP release here. Link to Acrobat (.pdf) file of complete comments here.

If you care about these issues – and if you’re reading this, you probably do – the Disaster Accountability Project is asking good questions.

Disaster Accountability Project (main site)

Disaster Accountability Project (blog)