AcademyWingman, points out in this post the folly of interrupting or slowing chlorine shipments because insurgents have used the trucks as weapons or targets (and as targets then immediately incorporated into the weapon, so to speak), creating deadly chlorine gas.

I urge you to read WingManX’s perceptive post – and assuming you have – I’d add the following points;

–  WingmanX contends that fear itself is a force multiplier for the insurgents; well put!  ;

– in a parallel manner, the chlorine becoms a force multiplier for an IED or truck bomb;

– But – the chlorine isn’t just chlorine  it’s like a big water truck – because the entire water supply’s cleanliness – the health of the entire Iraqi people depends  on potable water. If there were water deliveries – wouldn’t we devote great tactical and strategic forces – and intellectual resources- to making sure the population gets water? This is like letting people die of thirst – but slower  – because they’re dying not from dehydration (no water at all), but water-borne diseases, like dysentery;

In other words, if the enemy can bait us into depriving the Iraqi population of water – and our role there is to protect the Iraqis, and help them to rebuild, who’s winning if the chlorine can’t get through? The bad guys win big. They’re essentially dictating our strategy.
– See also last week’s coverage of Iraq’s power grid plans. They’re doing deals with the Chinese and the Iranians – for multi-megawatt systems. Entirely susceptible to attack. Apparently no one at the energy ministry has read the NPS “Solar Eagle” proposal – or anything abotu network theory.

– Robert Baer – in See No Evil 

described that sttae of sewer and water systems in one or two large Saudi cities – where subpar binLaden family construction has left the water system at risk for leaking from the sewage

system. (I’ll get a copy of the book and a page citation tomorrow).

We owe these people an infrastructure at least as good as what we found when we got there.